



Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Malaysian Disinformation Accounts

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 10:14 AM

To: Olga Belogolova [REDACTED], David Agranovich [REDACTED], Patrick Warren
[REDACTED]

Olga and David,

We are working on a project with Shane Harris, national security reporter at the Washington Post. I have something for you and your team related to this work and we are hoping you can help us out.

We've identified a network of accounts active in Malaysian politics across platforms. Based on our ongoing work exploring PRC social media activity, we have some compelling evidence these accounts are run by China. The idea that these accounts might be PRC is consistent with the actors these accounts support. We are hoping you might be able to confirm our attribution.

I'm obviously happy to chat if you want to know more about our attribution. I know Shane will want to talk to someone at FB eventually as well, if that is possible after you have had a chance to look at these accounts

Attached is a file with two tabs.

Tab one (content creators) lists about 50 Facebook accounts (in order of DOB) and (in many cases) Twitter accounts that repost the Facebook content. I would note a few things (1) a few of these accounts you have already suspended. (2) Most of these Facebook accounts have the same DOB, (3) At least one of these, rimasmalaysia, is also active on Instagram, and (4) there are clear suggestions the same actor is running both the Twitter and FB accounts.

Tab two (FB Commenters) lists just a few accounts that pretend to be real people but seem to dedicate their lives to commenting and reposting for the the accounts on the previous page (consider this list just a sample, there seem to be others).

Unrelated, Patrick and I are grateful to you for your effort to set up data sharing with Clemson. We've had MANY conversations with several different legal teams, however, and as of now it isn't looking good. They are very afraid of GDPR. We'll let you know if anything changes. It's very frustrating.

Best,

Darren

--

Darren L. Linvill
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University



Malaysian Trolls for FB.xlsx

17K



Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Russian Language Ukraine Disinformation

1 message

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Tue, Mar 22, 2022 at 8:01 AM

To: David Agranovich [REDACTED]

David,

I am writing a quick note regarding findings related to a [recent piece](#) we did with Craig Silverman and Jeff Kao of ProPublica. I know you have been particularly busy recently, but I hope you will hear me out.

Last March, we shared with Twitter a list of 244 Russian language CIO accounts. Our analysis found all 244 of these accounts to have a number of markers suggesting they were operated by a single actor. At that time, Twitter suspended about half of the accounts and suggested the others were authentic nationalist actors. A few months later, however, they suspended the remaining accounts we had supplied (save three which all went permanently inactive on the same day following your suspensions). This background is just to point out that this actor is extremely sophisticated and has the ability to appear authentic using the signals you monitor.

Craig shared several accounts with your team two weeks which seem very clearly connected with this ongoing campaign and continue to engage in pro-Russian disinformation related to Ukraine. I understand your team thoroughly examined this accounts and found them to be authentic.

Given the continuing bad news from Ukraine, I would be disappointed in myself if I didn't do everything I could to get you to take one more look at these accounts.

It is very clear to me, after weeks of analysis, that the accounts we shared with your team are operated by the same bad actor that operated accounts we shared with both Twitter and TikTok which those organizations suspended.

More specifically, these accounts:

1. Share persona (name and profile images, even branded content) of accounts on both Twitter and TikTok that have been suspended,
2. Share similar, often identical, content as suspended accounts at rates that cannot be explained by chance,
3. Post on the same schedule (time of day, days of the week, and vacation schedule) as accounts on TikTok and Twitter that have been suspended,
4. Have high rates of following and follower with one another,
5. Are still posting Russian language propaganda, despite the current Instagram ban in Russia.

I feel it is highly probable this actor is operating a number of accounts on your platform, but the seven we are most confident of (due to shared persona with suspended Twitter and TikTok accounts) are the following:

https://www.instagram.com/facktoria_com/
<https://www.instagram.com/eto.prosto.news/>
https://www.instagram.com/ma_love_russia_/
https://www.instagram.com/vladislavanisimov_/
<https://www.instagram.com/goreopoz1/>
https://www.instagram.com/ruskiy_mishka___/
https://www.instagram.com/mow_mood/

Twitter has been doing a fantastic job mitigating this actor on their platform, perhaps they can supply further insight.

Many thanks,

Darren

--

Darren L. Linvill
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University



Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Chinese Accounts

1 message

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Thu, Apr 21, 2022 at 6:54 AM

To: Olga Belogolova [REDACTED], David Agronovich [REDACTED], Patrick Warren
[REDACTED]

Olga and David,

This past February [NYT](#) and [ProPublica](#) reported on a network of Twitter accounts spreading anti-Western and pro-China disinformation. Their reporting suggested some 3000 twitter accounts were working to amplify a single Twitter account, Spicy Panda (@SpicyPandaAcc). They suggested this network was affiliated with iChongqing, a state linked multimedia platform based in Chongqing, China.

Our lab was also working on this network when the NYT/ProPublica research was published and our findings were very consistent with these public reports. One exception, however, is that we also found this network to be active, at least to a limited degree, on FB and Instagram.

Attached is a file containing the names of ten FB accounts and fourteen Instagram accounts we would encourage your team to examine. The consistencies between these accounts are evident on their face, particularly among the Instagram accounts. I would expect you might find more accounts linked to these. These are nearly all inactive.

Kind regards,

Darren

--

Darren L. Linvill
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University

**Spicy Panda_FB & Instagram.xlsx**

12K



Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Russian Network

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Fri, Sep 23, 2022 at 3:00 AM

To: David Agranovich [REDACTED]

David,

In March I reached out to you regarding a small but significant network of pro-Putin accounts active on Instagram. We did a piece with Craig Silverman for ProPublica about this network which was also active across a number of other networks. At the time the network, which shared specific personas across networks, had been suspended by both TikTok and Twitter. Since March I've also worked with Google to have a number of very large YouTube accounts suspended which were also clearly part of the same network.

Next week the Kyiv Post will be doing a piece on these accounts so I wanted to reach out to you one final time to try to understand why these accounts have been suspended by TikTok, Twitter, and YouTube, but remain active on Instagram. They have grown significantly since I first notified you of their presence.

A list of the accounts for which I have the highest confidence are below.

Putin_lapka

Active on Insta: https://www.instagram.com/sobachya_lapka/

Suspended on Youtube (173k subscribers!) and TikTok

Eto Prosto News

Active on Insta: https://www.instagram.com/eto_prosto_news/ (and gained 9k followers since I first informed them . . . this should be low hanging fruit)

Suspended on Youtube, TikTok, and Twitter (https://twitter.com/eto_prosto_news)

Facktoria_com

Active on Insta: https://www.instagram.com/facktoria_com/

Suspended on Twitter (see the link on their website, [Facktoria.com](https://www.facktoria.com))

goreopoz

Active on Insta: <https://www.instagram.com/goreopoz/>

Suspended TWICE on TikTok

vladislavanisimov_

Active on Insta: https://www.instagram.com/vladislavanisimov_/

Suspended on Twitter and TikTok (though it has recently re-booted on TikTok, as is mentioned on their Insta profile)

ma_love_russia

Active on Insta: https://www.instagram.com/ma_love_russia/

Suspended by both TikTok and YouTube.

ruskiy_mishka__

Active on Insta: https://www.instagram.com/ruskiy_mishka__/

Previously suspended on Twitter but now it is back: https://twitter.com/Ruskiy_Mishka . . . two weeks ago this account (which we were actively following as part of the network) was called @irka444 and had a

profile picture that was Vermeer's Girl with the Pearl Earring.

on_the_fingers

Active on Insta: https://www.instagram.com/on_the_fingers/ . . . and clearly the successor to facktoria (the facktoria account posted a lot about this puppets).

Active on Twitter and YouTube (but I haven't told either of them yet) <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCa2fnRpDc5tBD9pYehEJ4jQ/about>
https://twitter.com/on_the_fingers

Suspended by TikTok . . . because TikTok is ahead on this? (see dead link on YouTube page: <https://vm.tiktok.com/ZMNe2MNNw/>).

I look forward to any feedback you might be able to give.

Darren

--

Darren L. Linvill
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Disinformation introduction

Masterson, Matthew [REDACTED] Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 6:41 PM
To: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>, "Hale, Geoffrey" [REDACTED], Patrick Warren
Cc: "Scully, Brian" [REDACTED], "Snell, Allison" [REDACTED], "Branch, Kim (CTR)" [REDACTED]

Darren,

Thanks for the email. We would love to talk to you about the work we are doing. I have added my team to find a good time to talk.

Matt

Matthew Masterson
Senior Advisor
Department of Homeland Security
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>
Sent: Thursday, February 28, 2019 4:44 PM
To: Hale, Geoffrey; Masterson, Matthew; Patrick Warren
Subject: Disinformation introduction

Geoffrey and Matt,

Kevin Kane at Twitter gave us your contact information and suggested we link up.

My colleague Patrick Warren (Dept. of Economics) and I here at Clemson have been busy studying Russian disinformation on Twitter. You can get an idea of some of our work to date [here](#) and [here](#).

[Quoted text hidden]



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Disinformation introduction

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 2:37 PM

To: "Masterson, Matthew" [REDACTED]

Cc: "Hale, Geoffrey" [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED], "Scully, Brian"

"Snell, Allison" [REDACTED]

, "Branch, Kim (CTR)" [REDACTED]

Matt,

Great, we look forward to touching base. We can be flexible, but mid to late afternoon EST tends to be best for Patrick and I.

Darren

[Quoted text hidden]



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Troll Outreach

2 messages

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu> Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 5:28 PM
To: "Hale, Geoffrey" [REDACTED], "Masterson, Matthew" [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Gentlemen,

Following up on our conversation from earlier this week. We followed your advice and engaged in some public outreach regarding ongoing IRA activity. We thought you may want to have a read:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/russian-trolls-can-be-surprisingly-subtle-and-often-fun-to-read/2019/03/08/677f8ec2-413c-11e9-9361-301ffb5bd5e6_story.html?utm_term=.24190cfac7b4

Patrick and I look forward to talking again soon.

Have a great weekend,

Darren

--

Darren L. Linvill, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University

Masterson, Matthew [REDACTED] Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 11:01 AM
To: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>, "Hale, Geoffrey" [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED], "Scully, Brian" [REDACTED]

Darren,

This is fantastic. We appreciate you taking this pro active step. We are sharing with our folks and will let you know if we receive any feedback.

Matt

Matthew Masterson
Senior Advisor
Department of Homeland Security
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>
Sent: Friday, March 8, 2019 5:28 PM
To: Hale, Geoffrey; Masterson, Matthew; Patrick Warren
Subject: Troll Outreach

[Quoted text hidden]



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

short essay series - invitation to contribute

Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Tue, Sep 22, 2020 at 9:39 PM

To: Josh Goldstein [REDACTED]

Cc: Darren Linvill <DARRENL@clemson.edu>, Renee DiResta [REDACTED]

Count us in and put us down on one of the "not overblown" spots.

On Tue, Sep 22, 2020, 9:11 PM Josh Goldstein [REDACTED] wrote:

Dear Professor Linvill and Professor Warren,

Renee DiResta (cc'ed) and I have been putting together a series of short essays (700-900 words) on the question: "Is the threat of interstate influence operations overblown?"

The driving idea here is that discussion of foreign influence operations often assumes certain threat levels—we want to help increase the rigor of public conversation by having experts weigh in on this question explicitly. We're inviting a variety of perspectives from experts in influence operations and online manipulation and hope you might be interested in participating.

Based on your recent co-authored papers, we thought you would be in a great position to articulate the position that the threat of interstate influence operations is not overblown. We envision having three pieces on each side of the proposition (i.e. three argue "yes, overblown" and three argue "no, not overblown"), and have confirmed participation yesterday and today from participants including Josh Tucker, Laura Rosenberger/Lindsay Gorman (as co-authors), and Yochai Benkler. Renee and I would write an introductory framing piece, edit the series, and interface with an outlet - at the present time, we're in conversation with *Lawfare*.

Our thought was to have the pieces by October 7 in hope of publishing a few weeks before the election. We can offer a small honorarium for your time.

Thanks in advance for your consideration and hope to hear from you soon.

Best wishes,
Josh



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Missing Organizations?

6 messages

Patrick Warren <pwarren@clemson.edu>

Mon, May 30, 2022 at 12:05 AM

To: pwarren@clemson.edu

Bcc: [REDACTED] Joshua Tucker [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Renee DiResta [REDACTED]

Very quick question. Do you know any organizations in the for-profit/NGO/academic space that release publically-accessible reports (not academic studies) that analyze the behavior of CIOs or other organized bad actors on social media as a core element of their mission and isn't on the list, below? We are doing a survey of the field and don't want to miss anyone.

Thanks!

Patrick

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| Alliance for Securing Democracy | https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/ |
| Australian Strategic Policy Institute | https://www.aspi.org.au/program/international-cyber-policy-centre |
| CEDMO | http://cedmohub.eu |
| Center for Countering Digital Hate | https://www.counterhate.com/ |
| ClemsonHub | https://www.clemson.edu/centers-institutes/watt/hub/index.html |
| CSMAP | http://csmapnyu.org |
| DECACTO | https://defacto-observatoire.fr/Main/# |
| DFRLab | https://www.digitalsherlocks.org/about |
| Doublethink Lab | https://doublethinklab.org/ |
| EDMO BELUX | https://belux.edmo.eu/ |
| Election Integrity Partnership | https://www.eipartnership.net/ |
| EU Disinfo Lab | https://www.disinfo.eu/ |
| First Draft News | https://firstdraftnews.org/ |
| Global Disinformation Index | http://www.disinformationindex.org |
| Graphika | https://www.graphika.com/ |
| Iberifier | https://iberifier.eu/ |
| Institute for Strategic Dialogue | http://www.isdglobal.org |
| Luiss Datalab | https://datalab.luiss.it/ |
| Moonshot | http://www.moonshotteam.com |
| Myth Detector | https://mythdetector.ge/en/ |

NORDIS
Prague Security Studies Institute
Programme on Democracy & Technology

<https://datalab.au.dk/nordis>
<https://www.pssi.cz/>
<https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk>
<https://shorensteincenter.org/programs/technology-social-change/>

Shorenstein Center -- Technology and Social Change
Signa Lab

<https://signalab.mx/>
<https://www.disinfobservatory.org/>

Social Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis

<https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io>

Stanford Internet Observatory

<https://tattle.co.in/>

Tattle

<https://www.cip.uw.edu/>

UW - Center for an Informed Public

<https://verificado.com.mx/>

VerificadoMX

<https://www.viralityproject.org/>

Virality Project

<https://vsquare.org/>

VSquare

--

Patrick L. Warren
Associate Professor
John E Walker Dept. of Economics
Clemson University

Datalab, AU [REDACTED]
To: Patrick Warren <pwarren@clemson.edu>

Mon, May 30, 2022 at 4:18 AM

Dear Patrick,

I can see that some of the [EDMO Hubs](#) are included in your list, but I would say that they are all relevant. The ones missing are:

- Ireland hub: <https://edmohub.ie/>
- BENEDMO: <https://benedmo.eu/>
- IDMO: <https://www.idmo.it/>

Furthermore, it might be interesting to look at EDMO as a whole as well: <https://edmo.eu/>. You could also look at this overview of academic actors studying European disinformation: <https://edmo.eu/research-activities/>. And this one for fact-checking activities: <https://edmo.eu/fact-checking-activities/>

Best regards,

Mathias Holm Tveen

DATALAB, Aarhus University

[Quoted text hidden]

Patrick Warren <pwarren@clemson.edu>
To: [REDACTED]

Mon, May 30, 2022 at 8:41 AM

Dear Mathias,

Thank you so much for taking the time to respond. We'll make sure to investigate those.

Best,

Patrick
[Quoted text hidden]

Tim Squirrell [REDACTED] >
To: "pwarren@clemson.edu" <pwarren@clemson.edu>

Tue, Jun 7, 2022 at 10:42 AM

Hi Patrick,

A few below:

Nisos, Mandiant (formerly FireEye), Flashpoint, Alethea Group – all in the for-profit space but all publish occasional reports and blogs on bad actors/APTs.

All the best,

Tim

Dr Tim Squirrell

Head of Communications and Editorial

[PO Box 75769 | London | SW1P 9ER | UK](#)
T [+44 207 493 9333](tel:+442074939333) | W www.isdglobal.org

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[Quoted text hidden]

Patrick Warren <pwarren@clemson.edu>
To: Tim Squirrell [REDACTED]

Tue, Jun 7, 2022 at 11:52 AM

Very helpful! Thank you for taking the time to do it.

Best,

Patrick
[Quoted text hidden]

Renee DiResta [REDACTED]
To: Patrick Warren <pwarren@clemson.edu>

Mon, Jun 13, 2022 at 11:03 AM

Hey there – sorry, missed this previously! All of the ones that were top-of-mind you had, but the people who might be most helpful in finalizing your list would likely be Carnegie's PCIO since they are doing meta-research on the field.

Hope all is well! BTW – did you ever write up your theory about the Chinese bots' seemingly-useless hashtag stuffing behavior?

From: Patrick Warren <pwarren@clemson.edu>
Sent: Monday, May 30, 2022 12:06 AM
To: pwarren@clemson.edu
Subject: Missing Organizations?

[Quoted text hidden]

[Quoted text hidden]



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

[fakenewssci] Russian Influence - Double Deceit

Patrick Warren <pwarren@clemson.edu>

Tue, Mar 24, 2020 at 10:53 AM

To: Renee DiResta [REDACTED]

Seeing your presentation on Prigozhin's activities in Africa is what really pushed me over the edge on pursuing the Ghana/Russia connection.

Patrick L Warren

[Quoted text hidden]



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

[fakenewssci] Russian Influence - Double Deceit

Renee DiResta [REDACTED]

Tue, Apr 7, 2020 at 7:26 PM

To: Patrick Warren <pwarren@clemson.edu>

No kidding! That's really cool. :) Let us know if there's ever opportunities to collaborate, we have tons of data that's likely complementary.

[Quoted text hidden]



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

[fakenewssci] Russian Influence - Double Deceit

Renee DiResta [REDACTED]
To: Patrick Warren <pwarren@clermson.edu>

Tue, Apr 7, 2020 at 7:30 PM

btw literally sent your Harvard misinfo review paper to the team 10 minutes ago :)
[Quoted text hidden]



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Troll Outreach

2 messages

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu> Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 5:28 PM
To: "Hale, Geoffrey" [REDACTED] "Masterson, Matthew" [REDACTED] Patrick Warren
[REDACTED]

Gentlemen,

Following up on our conversation from earlier this week. We followed your advice and engaged in some public outreach regarding ongoing IRA activity. We thought you may want to have a read:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/russian-trolls-can-be-surprisingly-subtle-and-often-fun-to-read/2019/03/08/677f8ec2-413c-11e9-9361-301ffb5bd5e6_story.html?utm_term=.24190cfac7b4

Patrick and I look forward to talking again soon.

Have a great weekend,

Darren

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Darren L. Linvill, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University

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To: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>, "Hale, Geoffrey" [REDACTED], Patrick Warren
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Darren,

This is fantastic. We appreciate you taking this pro active step. We are sharing with our folks and will let you know if we receive any feedback.

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Matthew Masterson
Senior Advisor
Department of Homeland Security
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
[REDACTED]

From: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>
Sent: Friday, March 8, 2019 5:28 PM
To: Hale, Geoffrey; Masterson, Matthew; Patrick Warren
Subject: Troll Outreach

[Quoted text hidden]



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Connecting on information sharing

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Sun, Aug 1, 2021 at 8:59 PM

To: "Jacob N. Shapiro" [REDACTED]

Cc: Olga Belogolova [REDACTED], "pwarren@clemson.edu" <pwarren@clemson.edu>, Heather Alpino [REDACTED], Anneliese Agren [REDACTED], David Agranovich [REDACTED], Steven Siegel [REDACTED]

Thanks, Olga, for your effort moving this forward. We look forward to next steps.

Darren

[Quoted text hidden]

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Darren L. Linvill
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University

Malaysian Disinformation Accounts

1 message

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Sun, Jan 9, 2022 at 7:14 PM

To: Olga Belogolova [REDACTED], David Agranovich [REDACTED], Patrick Warren

Olga and David,

We are working on a project with Shane Harris, national security reporter at the Washington Post. I have something for you and your team related to this work and we are hoping you can help us out.

We've identified a network of accounts active in Malaysian politics across platforms. Based on our ongoing work exploring PRC social media activity, we have some compelling evidence these accounts are run by China. The idea that these accounts might be PRC is consistent with the actors these accounts support. We are hoping you might be able to confirm our attribution.

I'm obviously happy to chat if you want to know more about our attribution. I know Shane will want to talk to someone at FB eventually as well, if that is possible after you have had a chance to look at these accounts

Attached is a file with two tabs.

Tab one (content creators) lists about 50 Facebook accounts (in order of DOB) and (in many cases) Twitter accounts that repost the Facebook content. I would note a few things (1) a few of these accounts you have already suspended. (2) Most of these Facebook accounts have the same DOB, (3) At least one of these, rimasmalaysia, is also active on Instagram, and (4) there are clear suggestions the same actor is running both the Twitter and FB accounts.

Tab two (FB Commenters) lists just a few accounts that pretend to be real people but seem to dedicate their lives to commenting and reposting for the the accounts on the previous page (consider this list just a sample, there seem to be others).

Unrelated, [REDACTED]

Best,

Darren

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Darren L. Linvill
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University



Malaysian Trolls for FB.xlsx

17K



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Chinese Accounts

1 message

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 4:54 PM

To: Olga Belogolova [REDACTED], David Agranovich [REDACTED], Patrick Warren
[REDACTED]

Olga and David,

This past February [NYT](#) and [ProPublica](#) reported on a network of Twitter accounts spreading anti-Western and pro-China disinformation. Their reporting suggested some 3000 twitter accounts were working to amplify a single Twitter account, Spicy Panda (@SpicyPandaAcc). They suggested this network was affiliated with iChongqing, a state linked multimedia platform based in Chongqing, China.

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Kind regards,

Darren

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Darren L. Linvill
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University



Spicy Panda_FB & Instagram.xlsx

12K

Support ASD on Giving Tuesday!

1 message

Laura Rosenberger [REDACTED]
To: pwarren@clemson.edu

Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 10:33 AM

Having trouble reading this email? [View it in your browser](#)



Alliance for Securing
Democracy

Dear Patrick,

At the Alliance for Securing Democracy, we constantly explore ways to bolster and protect our democratic values at home and abroad by working with policymakers, the private sector, and civil society. Doing so not only strengthens the resilience of democracies worldwide, but it also reaffirms the democratic experiment.

This work cannot be done without generous contributions from people like you. [We hope you will consider supporting ASD's bipartisan work on Giving Tuesday.](#)

Despite the pandemic, the ASD team has virtually traversed the country and the globe to [share](#) our research findings and strategies for countering authoritarian efforts to undermine democracy. This year, ASD released [20 reports](#) focused on developing transatlantic relations, securing the future Internet, and protecting the democratic process from malign actors. We convened a bipartisan task force of 30 leading experts to craft a [national security strategy](#) for the United States to regain the initiative in the emerging competition with authoritarianism. ASD also held a [virtual simulation](#) of foreign interference in the 2020 election—in which we identified gaps and seams in our patchwork of policies—and we worked with local partners to hold more than [10 bipartisan events](#) around the United States on foreign interference in 2020.

Please consider supporting ASD's efforts to strengthen democracy by donating [here](#).

Thank you for supporting the Alliance for Securing Democracy.

Wishing you a happy holiday season,

Laura Rosenberger and Zack Cooper

[Donate](#)


Strengthening Transatlantic Relations



To unsubscribe, please email sweaver@gmfus.org.

Securing Democracy Dispatch

1 message

Laura Rosenberger 
To: pwarren@clemson.edu

Tue, May 26, 2020 at 5:49 PM

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Securing Democracy Dispatch



Alliance for Securing
Democracy

May 26, 2020

Announcements

Today, Director Laura Rosenberger, Hon. Dominic LeBlanc, President of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, and Brad Smith, President of Microsoft, announced that the Government of Canada has joined Microsoft and the Alliance for Securing Democracy in co-championing the *Community on Countering Election Interference* as part of the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace. This community is a multi-stakeholder effort that brings together representatives from government, industry, and civil society to highlight best practices in countering cyber threats to elections and democracy and build partners' capabilities to defend against these threats. You can watch the video [here](#).

Deputy Director David Salvo and Non-resident Fellow Heidi Tworek said that **by leveraging our respective strengths and working closely with likeminded partners around the world, ASD, Microsoft, and the Government of Canada will provide a template that can make democracies more resilient and more secure.**

Our Take

While Congress has provided some election security funding, more is needed to address the twin priorities of combating foreign interference and making pandemic-related election adjustments, ASD's Election Integrity Fellow David Levine argued in a new report with the Bipartisan Policy Center's Elections Project Director Matthew Weil, *20 for 20: 20 Ways to Protect the 2020 Presidential Election*. The report, which identifies 20 ways states could further protect the presidential election with additional funding, was featured in *Election Line*, *The Fulcrum*, and *The Election Law Blog*.

As decision makers focus on shoring up public health systems and economies, Russian and Chinese information campaigns are having a mutually reinforcing effect; both countries are actively spreading conspiracy theories and obscuring the distinction between fact and fiction, Head of Policy and Research Jessica Brandt wrote with Torrey Taussig in a Brookings Institution blog post.

Deepfakes can erode the trust necessary for a democracy to function by injecting misleading content into the information environment and by making the public question the very nature of truth itself, Fellow for Emerging Technologies Lindsay Gorman told *Girl Security*.

Read ASD's latest coronavirus and information manipulation work [here](#).

Hamilton 2.0 Analysis

Russia Tophlines

The coronavirus remained the most dominant topic for the Russian media ecosystem last week, with no change in the amount of coverage from the previous week. In non-coronavirus coverage, two other topics of interest emerged: messaging (largely from government and diplomatic Twitter accounts) highlighted reports of rising anti-Semitism in the West, and coverage of the Biden-Poroshenko tapes sought to cast doubt on Ukrainian independence and the legitimacy of former Vice President and presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden's efforts to remove a former Ukrainian prosecutor general. Meanwhile on YouTube, RT America covered privacy and surveillance concerns surrounding coronavirus track and trace apps in the United States and negatively portrayed U.S. foreign policy in various regions.

China Tophlines

The coronavirus remained ubiquitous in Chinese state media and government communications in the first half of last week. However, China's annual parliamentary meetings, commonly referred to as the "Two Sessions," featured prominently in Beijing's messaging in the second half of the week. Announcements out of the Two Sessions and their subsequent promotion by Chinese officials and state media emphasized the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) empathy toward the suffering of Chinese citizens, as well as a corresponding ruthlessness towards anyone who would challenge the CCP worldview. On a different matter, China's propaganda apparatus has also been mobilizing to defend the government's plan to impose a new national security law on Hong Kong.

Read more of the analysis [here](#).

News and Commentary

Controversy over absentee voting continues, while bipartisan support grows among some state elected officials: Last week, Republican officeholders in at least 16 states that do not have all-mail elections, including Georgia, Iowa, Nebraska, and West Virginia, encouraged residents to vote absentee due to the coronavirus outbreak. Some state elected officials on both sides of the aisle have supported expanded absentee voting, despite President Trump's vocal opposition to it and his recent criticism of Nevada and Michigan's decisions to mail absentee ballots and absentee ballot applications, respectively, to all registered voters. Experts and election officials say they expect a significant increase in voting by mail this fall and are expressing concerns about the logistical and economic challenges of adjusting voting practices. Fellow for Elections Integrity David Levine outlined in a new report various ways to mitigate the potential risks of administering more

voting by mail due to the coronavirus; he recommends that states share guidance on best practices with their localities. (*The Washington Post*, *Politico*, *PolitiFact*, *ASD*)

Apple, Google roll out “exposure notification” software to be used in apps

tracking the spread of the coronavirus: Last Wednesday, Apple and Google launched an “exposure notification” tool that will allow public health authorities to create apps that notify users of potential exposure to others diagnosed with the coronavirus. The tech companies emphasized that the new system is not an app for tracing the spread of the virus, but rather a tool developers can incorporate into their own applications, which will leverage Bluetooth sharing signals. Local health authorities in states like North Dakota, and other countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada, have asked for more control over the data their apps can collect; they say the new software does not provide them with enough information to improve their contact tracing efforts, such as necessary location data, which Apple and Google have declined to provide due to privacy concerns. Fellow for Emerging Technologies Lindsay Gorman has underscored the need to strike a meaningful balance between protecting privacy and civil liberties in developing tools to combat the coronavirus. (*The Washington Post*, *TechCrunch*, *The Verge*, *Twitter*).

Tech companies face challenges as coronavirus misinformation spreads to new platforms:

Misinformation about the coronavirus is spreading on new, unexpected sites such as the popular video app, TikTok, the digital library, Internet Archive, and productivity tools like Google Drive. These platforms have recently become conduits for material such as the viral “Plandemic” video, which recast conspiracy theories about the coronavirus and gained more than eight million views on YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram just over a week after it was released. Although the video was banned by various online platforms and its claims widely debunked, researchers say it has resurfaced; clips and trailers were found on multiple social media platforms with links to the full video. Fellow for Emerging Technologies Lindsay Gorman and Research Assistant Nathan Kohlenberg have argued that online platforms’ response to the growing coronavirus “infodemic” is their strongest attempt to police disinformation to date; although, the actual results have been mixed. Gorman and Kohlenberg advocate for even and uniform enforcement of these new policies and a greater reliance on automation. (*The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, *ASD*)

In case you missed it

- According to researchers at Carnegie Mellon University, nearly half of the Twitter accounts spreading messages online about the coronavirus are likely bots, and their posts appear to be aimed at sowing division within the United States.
- The Chinese Communist Party will impose a national security law in Hong Kong to criminalize “foreign interference,” secessionist activities, and subversion of state power, officials said last Thursday; U.S. lawmakers have since announced plans to introduce bipartisan legislation that would sanction Chinese officials who enforce the new national security law.
- The UK government is conducting a review into the impact of allowing Huawei equipment to be used in British 5G networks following the United States’ recent decision to bring sanctions against the Chinese telecom giant.

- Last week, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg called upon the European Union to lead in establishing a legal framework for regulating online platforms.

ASD in the News

Canada takes leading role in global cybersecurity effort to counter election meddling, *Globalnews.ca*. Features ASD

Government of Canada leading globally to promote cybersecurity and counter disinformation online, *Newsire.ca*. Features ASD

China launches new Twitter accounts, 90,000 tweets in COVID-19 info war, *NBC News*. Comments by Fellow for Media and Digital Disinformation Bret Schafer. This research was also highlighted in *Fox News*, *Daily Caller*, and *Outlook India*

China's 'wolf warrior' diplomats are ready to fight, *The Wall Street Journal*. Features ASD Research

COVID19 Disinformation and the Global Battle of Narratives: A U.S. and EU Perspective, German Marshall Fund. Comments by Director Laura Rosenberger and Program Manager and Fellow Nad'a Kovalcikova

COVID-19: Liberal views and responses worldwide – responses from Europe, Friedrich Naumann Foundation. Comments by Program Manager and Fellow Nad'a Kovalcikova

Iran Quietly Lowers the Temperature With U.S., *The New York Times*. Comments by Fellow for the Middle East Ariane Tabatabai

Quote of the Week

"This year, we should prepare for the strong possibility that the price we pay to protect the health of our people and our democracy is a long wait after Election Day. Taking the time for an accurate count will enhance the legitimacy of the election, not undermine it."

- Commissioner on the Federal Election Commission **Ellen Weintraub** and Princeton University Professor of History **Kevin Kruse** wrote in an op-ed about adjustments being made to voting as a result of the coronavirus pandemic (May 18, 2020)

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Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

IRA Affiliated Accounts

8 messages

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 2:49 PM

To: [REDACTED], Kevin Kane [REDACTED] >, Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Yoel and Kevin,

Patrick and I wanted to follow-up on our conversation yesterday regarding current accounts we believe are affiliated with IRA activity. The accounts below are some of those which we have, to what we consider a high degree of probability, identified as being connected to IRA activity. These particular accounts have all been suspended by your team. We have seven additional account we have identified with confidence, many of which are currently involved in "doxing" behavior.

We are confident these are specifically IRA and not other operators because we have tied several of the behaviors listed below to accounts in today's data set, including WokeLuisa.

Donie O'Sullivan approached your team with two of these accounts a couple of weeks ago (PoliteMelanie and Matsamon) and you suspended each. The week prior PoliteMelanie was honored to win the Chicago Tribune's tweet of the week contest. These accounts are all quite sophisticated and accrue followers quickly.

To identify these as IRA we have a number of criteria:

1. They consistently steal content from the same set of source Twitter accounts (often with more than one account stealing the same tweet at different times, accounts sometimes delete tweets so another account can use it). Stealing content directly is not as common now as it was even a couple of months ago.
2. They consistently retweet the same set of accounts.
3. They tweet at consistent times using a desktop computer.
4. There is no identifying information. Obviously.
5. Occasional commonalities in art and design.
6. Commonalities in the email with which the account is registered.
7. They start life following a large number of ideologically engaged users.
8. They all have recent birth dates.

Final Handle Aliases

BlkAndPrOud Wanda_BLM, VoiceBLM, ALLUSBLM, A_LIVES_USA

blm_voice

BAP_WW

FREEBLM WE_BAP_US, inforacism, HYCLINTON, WPERFECT

nowstoptrump

BAP_US BAP2017, JackAlison2

us_blm

QuartneyChante

shum_vanessa

kimblackproudDAVIS_WHYNOT

sajede_dalili

usblk BlkAndProud11

PoliteMelanie
Matsamon

We would appreciate any feedback you may be able to share regarding these accounts.

Darren

--

Darren L. Linvill, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University

Yoel Roth [REDACTED] Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 7:00 PM

To: darrenl@g.clemson.edu

Cc: Yoel Roth [REDACTED] >, Kevin Kane [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Hi Darren,

Looking forward to discussing these accounts when we next have time for a call. In the interim, though, I'd be interested in understanding how you're using email commonalities as a signal in your attribution. The email address used to register an account is not public information, and wouldn't be generally available...

Yoel

[Quoted text hidden]

Patrick Warren [REDACTED] Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 7:13 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>, Kevin Kane [REDACTED]

We pretend to have forgot the password and infer from the shortened email.

Patrick L Warren

[Quoted text hidden]

Yoel Roth [REDACTED] Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 7:16 PM

To: Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Cc: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], darrenl@g.clemson.edu, Kevin Kane [REDACTED]

Got it, thanks. Will share more thoughts on the phone.

[Quoted text hidden]



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Coordinated Activity

5 messages

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 11:30 AM

To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Kevin Kane [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Yoel,

I hope you are well.

Patrick and I have been following a half dozen accounts that we have great confidence to be IRA. One just surpassed 10k followers and with that level of influence we'd like to give it to your team to consider suspending it: @helenkaren94.

She has been very successful. Happy to go into greater detail about how we have identified this account and attribute it's activity to the IRA.

In addition, I've pasted two small networks below. These are both relatively new, we obviously don't have attribution on these. They are not particularly sophisticated or influential yet, but they are clearly engaging in political/cultural influence. No clear monetary motivation. They do not seem, on the surface, to be run by the same group or individual as one another. Each network self-identifies as originating in a different country, but they target U.S. conversations and communities.

Vietnam Network:

<https://twitter.com/Blackrace4>
https://twitter.com/today_african
<https://twitter.com/blackafricanism>
<https://twitter.com/afromonth>
<https://twitter.com/worldafrican1>

Ghana Network:

https://twitter.com/blackpride__
https://twitter.com/blac_impact
https://twitter.com/black_emin
https://twitter.com/black_topics
<https://twitter.com/Blackindark2>
https://twitter.com/Black_mind_inc
<https://twitter.com/ColouredBarrie1>
<https://twitter.com/DCommeH>
https://twitter.com/black_is_able

I hope these help.

Darren

--

Darren L. Linvill, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University

Yoel Roth [REDACTED]

Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 11:49 AM

To: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Cc: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Kevin Kane [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Thanks, Darren. We'll dig in. We'd of course be grateful if you shared any other specific leads you're tracking, even if they haven't yet attained the following of the account you highlighted. Early intervention on potential manipulation is one of the

most valuable things we can do to address some of these challenges.

Yoel

[Quoted text hidden]

Darren Linvill <darren@g.clemson.edu>

Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 2:34 PM

To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED]

Cc: Kevin Kane [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Yoel,

Is early intervention really the best way address the challenge? I'm not sure I entirely agree.

First of all, we are well past early intervention with the IRA. The accounts we are following are smart and sophisticated and exceedingly hard to spot. More important, however, they aren't going away. When you shut down Helen (as I hope you do) the human capital used to produce her will be reapplied to another account, likely one we haven't identified.

You have to accept a certain amount of coordinated disinformation. The question is, how much do you accept?

Patrick and I would argue the right time to shut down an account is around 4k followers, there's a bit of a bend in the growth J curve at that point. Before then they still have an impact (the 3k follower accounts we are watching are still getting hundreds and sometimes thousands of retweets) but it is acceptable. There is value in letting the small accounts live because they take IRA resources but their impact is limited.

Everyone keeps using the whack-a-mole metaphor, but that is the wrong game to play . . . at least with the state sponsored accounts.

Just my two cents. Would be happy to talk further. I have a couple of additional accounts I can give you tomorrow, need to make sure we get all the data first.

Darren

[Quoted text hidden]

Yoel Roth [REDACTED]

Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 3:03 PM

To: Darren Linvill <darren@g.clemson.edu>

Cc: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Kevin Kane [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Thanks, Darren. Appreciate your perspective on these issues and the depth of thought you've put into this. We've adopted a similarly nuanced approach here that's by no means focused solely on removal. As always, we value anything you're able to share about what you're working on, particularly if that's information you have shared or intend to share with others.

Yoel

[Quoted text hidden]

Darren Linvill <darren@g.clemson.edu>

Fri, Jul 12, 2019 at 9:24 AM

To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED], Kevin Kane [REDACTED]

>

Here are two additional probable IRA accounts. Happy to discuss further if you are interested in how we identify and assign attribution. We've observed several changes in tactics over the past year.

These accounts, as well as the account I shared yesterday, have all been heavily involved in doxing activity.

<https://twitter.com/darkhairme>

<https://twitter.com/AliceBlumm>

On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 4:03 PM Darren Linvill <darren@g.clemson.edu> wrote:

I'm glad to hear your approach is adapting. As I have expressed before, we are happy to help in any way you feel would be valuable.

We regularly share what we've learned, as well as accounts we feel are suspicious, with various federal agencies. I assume when you say "share with others" in this context, however, you mean media.

I understand and wholeheartedly agree with this concern.

I shared this with Kevin earlier today, but we have been very concerned about the number of false alarms raised by researchers in recent weeks. I'm sure you saw Caroline Orr made headlines last week, including in the NYT, after suggesting coordinated bot activity was disseminating disinformation about Kamala Harris. Earlier last week another researcher suggested Gateway Pundit was running a bot network. As you know, both claims were based on limited information and too little analysis. I spent an hour talking CNN out of doing the very story the Times and others ran. Patrick and I feel these types of claims spread paranoia that plays right into the hopes of the Russians. In general, we've noted Twitter has been relatively mute on such stories while in some cases they would be fairly easy to disprove (as I did for CNN). We would be happy to discuss this further.

Please know we have been exceedingly careful with what we have shared with the media. In cases where Patrick and I have publicly attributed accounts to IRA activity it has not been done lightly. There are a list of factors we look at before we will put our careers on the line in saying something is IRA. I am still very confident about every account we have made public.

We have always gone to you with accounts we feel to be IRA (and others) before allowing them to be published. Your team has not confirmed our attributions in these cases but nor have you given us any information to lead us to revise our assumptions. To be frank, all of our exchanges have been exceedingly one sided. Obviously we want to supply correct and reliable information to the media, we would love your help in doing so. Happy to speak confidentially or sign an NDA if need be.

Thanks, Yoel.

[Quoted text hidden]

[Quoted text hidden]



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Request from NATO STRATCOM COE

1 message

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Tue, Nov 26, 2019 at 5:13 PM

To: Kevin Kane [REDACTED], Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Gentlemen,

We had a colleague reach out to us. Amanda Rivkin is a senior expert at NATO STRATCOM COE in Riga. They are "are looking at some QAnon related stuff and were hoping to get a read on why the accounts below might have been suspended."

I don't know if you are either willing or even able to help them but I wanted to at least reach out and see if I might be able to put her in touch with either of you.

The accounts they are interested in are listed below.

I hope you are both preparing for a very happy Thanksgiving break!

Best,

Darren

@ReIncarnatedET
@ilmforg
@kbq225
@drsUPERelite
@savedangel61
@45_schedule
@buddhakatze
@toddpenley

--

Darren L. Linvill
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Disinfo Network

8 messages

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu> Fri, Mar 6, 2020 at 9:56 AM
To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Kevin Kane [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Yoel,

I saw you were working from home, I hope that is working out.

Somehow we let CNN cut us out of the discussion with you regarding the RU activity we've been following. I wanted to take just a moment and touch base directly on a couple of things.

Clarissa told us you are hoping to shut down the accounts today. I was hoping to get it done before Super Tuesday, so more than happy to move forward. I think everyone has all the data they need.

I'm not sure what CNN or the feds have shared with you, but it is likely our list has been updated since you got information from either party. We're currently tracking 32 Russian accounts, 8 accounts from the Nigerian operation, and a couple of Ghanaian accounts that weren't previously suspended. Let me know if you need these account names.

I was hoping we could leave a couple of the smaller accounts active to track if they change their behavior. It is likely they would simply abandon them (as they have done in the past) but always worth a try.

Finally, if it would be of interest we would be happy to schedule a debrief with your team to share how we pieced these accounts together and what we have learned about their developing tactics.

Darren

--
Darren L. Linvill
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu> Sun, Mar 8, 2020 at 5:28 PM
To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Kevin Kane [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Yoel,

We saw you suspended a portion of the Russian accounts yesterday, those that CNN had given you.

As you know, we have more. Please let us know if you'd like to discuss.

Darren
[Quoted text hidden]

Yoel Roth [REDACTED] Sun, Mar 8, 2020 at 5:31 PM
To: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>
Cc: Kevin Kane [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED], Yoel Roth [REDACTED]

Hi Darren,

Thanks for reaching out. If you have information you'd like to share with us, please feel free to pass it on; we're eager to investigate, and can find time to debrief in the coming week. I'd note that activity similar to what this network was engaged in may not actually be connected to the same actors (and there's a lot out there that's similar that's decided not Russian - the same attribution challenges we've discussed in the past).

Yoel
[Quoted text hidden]

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Sun, Mar 8, 2020 at 8:15 PM

To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED]
Cc: Kevin Kane [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Yoel,

File attached. Highlighted in yellow are a few accounts you suspended as we observed them. Highlighted in red are the accounts you suspended yesterday. Unhighlighted rows are still active accounts.

All of these accounts are the same network and connected to the Ghanaian accounts you suspended a week ago.

Your concerns are noted. I know your life is filled with people, often "professionals", making misguided accusations of coordinated activity, but I hope you'll learn to trust us. Various federal agencies, Graphika, and CNN have all been looped in on this and everybody is on the same page. These seem to be Russian.

I would note one of these accounts, RogueCharisma, I gave to your team back in September and it remains active.

We look forward to briefing you on how we connect all these accounts together. Let us know some times that work.

Darren
[Quoted text hidden]

 **Handles for Yoel 03-08-20.xlsx**
10K

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Mon, Mar 9, 2020 at 10:57 AM

To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Stacia Cardille [REDACTED]
Cc: Kevin Kane [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Yoel,

We saw you also suspended accounts originating in Nigeria (but tied to the broader RU operation).

Two accounts were not on the list you were supplied:
Was @TheBlaqCulture, changed handle yesterday to @DOfficial_One.
Was @ThrillBlack, changed handle yesterday to @Evanderrrr.

Again, please let us know when you have time to chat further.

Darren

[Quoted text hidden]

Yoel Roth [REDACTED]

Mon, Mar 9, 2020 at 11:25 AM

To: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>, Patrick Conlon [REDACTED]
Cc: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Stacia Cardille [REDACTED], Kevin Kane [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Hi Darren,

Thanks for sharing this. We're going to dig in today. I'm adding [+Patrick Conlon](#) on my team, who is our lead on this investigation.

What does your availability look like on Tuesday 3/10 for a call to check in on findings? Would 11-11:30am PT work?

Thanks,

Yoel
[Quoted text hidden]

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>
To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED]
Cc: Patrick Conlon [REDACTED], Stacia Cardille [REDACTED], Kevin Kane [REDACTED]
Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Mon, Mar 9, 2020 at 12:08 PM


11:00 PT works for us.

Do you have a preferred comm method?


Three images attached as points of discussion tomorrow.

Darren
[Quoted text hidden]

3 attachments



LatinolnNevada.PNG
96K



Tyler_Will.PNG
90K



KerrryC.PNG
101K

Yoel Roth [REDACTED]
To: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>
Cc: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Patrick Conlon [REDACTED], Stacia Cardille [REDACTED], Kevin Kane [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Mon, Mar 9, 2020 at 12:19 PM

I'll send a Google Meet invite shortly. Thanks!
[Quoted text hidden]



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Old Ghana

11 messages

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 2:53 PM

To: Patrick Conlon [REDACTED], Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Thanks for chatting today. Happy to talk further about the RU accounts if there is any interest.

As promised, here are the old Ghanaian accounts we tracked in the past.

On July 11 I sent you the following accounts, which you suspended:

https://twitter.com/blackpride__
https://twitter.com/blac_impact
https://twitter.com/black_emin
https://twitter.com/black_topics
<https://twitter.com/Blackindark2>
https://twitter.com/Black_mind_inc
<https://twitter.com/ColouredBarrie1>
<https://twitter.com/DCommeh>
https://twitter.com/black_is_able

In September I shared these accounts with Kevin:

<https://twitter.com/AfricaMustWake>
<https://twitter.com/AfricanIsBless>
https://twitter.com/black_mind_incc
<https://twitter.com/BlackBarriers>
https://twitter.com/TheBlackVoice_

Only AfricanIsBless and TheBlackVoice_ were suspended from that group.

I hope these help.

DL

--

Darren L. Linvill
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 4:10 PM

To: Patrick Conlon [REDACTED], Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Yoel an Patrick,

We saw that you suspended the remaining accounts we shared. Thanks for your work on this.

I also noticed noticed you suspended one of the smaller accounts we did not disclose and held back for observation, @proud_tay.

This leads us to a couple of questions. (1) Can you tell me if you were able to identify other accounts we missed? I understand you can't share details, but we would love to have some idea of the percentage of the fish we were able to catch. (2) In the future, might it be possible to discuss more strategic approaches to suspending accounts?

Darren

[Quoted text hidden]

Yoel Roth [REDACTED]
To: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>
Cc: Patrick Conlon [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED], Yoel Roth [REDACTED]

Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 4:15 PM

Hey Darren,

Thanks for reaching out and sharing this information. We're still investigating here, and don't have final answers on who was behind these accounts. Please don't yet read into our enforcement actions anything other than that the accounts violated the Twitter Rules.

Happy to discuss strategic enforcement options in the future. As I've said previously, this is a very challenging one for us, and one where you and I may disagree about the best path forward. If you're observing other accounts that are targeting US political conversations, I would strongly urge you to responsibly disclose them so we can mitigate their impact on the American public. We, and the Senate Intelligence Committee, and Robert Mueller, have all called for open info-sharing here; no one benefits from the continued presence of inauthentic activity on social media.

Yoel
[Quoted text hidden]

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>
To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED]
Cc: Patrick Conlon [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 4:52 PM

Yoel,

Yes, I kept back a couple of smaller accounts from Twitter. I think there are two strategic reasons to do this.

First, the Russians are going to continue this activity on your platform regardless of your actions. That has been shown repeatedly. Given that, why suspend small accounts? The strategic choice is to make them waste their effort building accounts. I would suggest not suspending any accounts below a given threshold.

Second, and more importantly for our work, we were able to identify this Russian network by understanding their behavior (again, happy to share more). If accounts from the current network continue to operate but change their tactics in some important way, that is crucial information.

I would also note, while we didn't share all accounts with Twitter, we share everything with law enforcement.

In any case, it's likely moot. In the past when we held back accounts they simply stopped tweeting when the rest of the network was suspended. That is likely what will happen this time.

Darren

[Quoted text hidden]

Yoel Roth [REDACTED]
To: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>
Cc: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Patrick Conlon [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 12:37 PM

Hi Darren,

Thanks for this. I definitely understand your perspective on the strategy here; but it's not the one we choose to advance in this space, based on our approach, and the approach of the rest of the industry, to combatting these threats. We're always happy to engage directly on findings you have, which will likely be faster than waiting for them to go through cycles with law enforcement; but if your preference is to share in that way, we can manage there as well.

As always, I appreciate the open dialogue here. Thanks again for the time yesterday.

Yoel
[Quoted text hidden]

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 1:26 PM

To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED]

Cc: Patrick Conlon [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Yoel,

I also understand that you and the other platforms operate with a variety of constraints that influence your response. Differing toolboxes from us as well, and each have their value.

I imagine that how we respond to coordinated activity we see moving forward will always depend on the nature of that activity.

I appreciate the open channel. As always, if you have any additional questions about our methods or findings, don't hesitate to ask.

Best,

Darren

Also, here's a weird little trio of accounts you should suspend. Possibly more related:

<https://twitter.com/Africanproudssi>

<https://twitter.com/BlackGirdll>

<https://twitter.com/BlackAfricansll>

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Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 2:11 PM

To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED]

Cc: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>, Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Patrick Conlon [REDACTED]

I'll be honest.. we talked to the feds and, later CNN, for three main reasons.

1. They seemed to take us more seriously.
2. They seemed more interested in working with us. Not just taking tips from us and disappearing with them but actually having ongoing discussions about hows and whys. In a sense... they seemed to find us more useful than you do.
3. They supported our work, with resources and with information. CNN dedicated a researcher with whom we worked closely. They sent a team to Africa to follow up on something we saw. In addition to some help with resources, law enforcement has been open with us to the extent they can under regulatory restrictions. Those bi-directional information flows are extremely helpful in our work.

PLW

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Patrick L. Warren
Associate Professor of Economics
John E. Walker Dept. of Economics
Clemson University

Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 8:59 PM

To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED]

Cc: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>, Patrick Conlon [REDACTED]

Hey y'all. One more quick note. We got a peek at the forthcoming Ghana release and we're really surprised to see Anthony Owo on it. We had put him together with the rest of the accounts that we believe are emanating from Russia. He follows the shift pattern that we talked about yesterday, to a T. If you have some way to link him to the Ghanaiana that is super interesting because I can link him to the fake face accounts with a really high level of confidence.

Anyway before you make that release, he might be worth a second look.

Patrick L Warren

[Quoted text hidden]

Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 9:30 PM

To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED]

Cc: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>, Patrick Conlon [REDACTED]

To illustrate, I've attached little doc that shows timing graphs over a period of time for 4 accounts. They are similar for all the accounts that we put in the Russian group. No making fun of my kludged graphs. I can put something prettier together once we setup a longer talk. But I wanted to illustrate what we're talking about.

In these graphs, the bins are hours of the day (UTC). Blue is Twitter Web App and Red is Tweetdeck. The wordcloud is hashtags.

PLW

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illustration_for_Twitter.pdf

175K

Yoel Roth [REDACTED]

Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 9:30 PM

To: Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Cc: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>, Patrick Conlon [REDACTED]

Thank you very, very much for flagging this. Looks like we missed this one as we were parsing out the AI face accounts from the Ghanaian ones. (We'd initially merged based on some confusing info we got from CNN, and then had to manually separate everything.) We sent our data to CNN as we were still working on finalizing it, so it's a little surprising that they shared a non-final set with yall, but seems like this worked out.

Yoel

[Quoted text hidden]

Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 9:32 PM

To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED]

Cc: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>, Patrick Conlon [REDACTED]

I think everyone just want to get it right.

[Quoted text hidden]



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

"Digital Black Face" Accounts

3 messages

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Tue, Oct 13, 2020 at 7:58 PM

To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Neema Guliani [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Yoel,

We worked on this odd network of "Digital Black Face" Trump supporters over the past couple of days with Craig Timberg from the Post. Your team did a good job cleaning those accounts up in a relatively quick manner. Bumped up against some other Black conservative accounts, unrelated but with various signs of clear inauthenticity. Passing along . . .

@GodrellB
@RagnarBenson
@MyBoyTrump
@Rumpelstilski
@BriannaWalks

Related to work we are doing with the Commission on Presidential Debates, we have identified a few other random accounts with various, obvious signs of inauthenticity. Again, passing along in case they are useful:

@EllaWal90354303
@Jet1Jack
@IAMGODDARDX
@classytexasgirl
@SusanStJames3
@8_27J

I hope you are well.

DL

--

Darren L. Linvill
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University

Yoel Roth [REDACTED]

Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 12:57 PM

To: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Cc: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Neema Guliani [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Belatedly - thanks for flagging.

[Quoted text hidden]

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 5:28 PM

To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED]

Cc: Neema Guliani [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Yoel,

More for you.

Attached, please find a list of about 100 coordinated and inauthentic accounts. These accounts are very likely connected to this gentleman: <https://twitter.com/MuhammadShojaee>

He was suspended from Insta sometime in the past couple of weeks. These accounts not only repeat his religious messaging, but also Iranian state messaging.

Much of the work identifying these accounts was done by Clemson Undergraduate students. Their full report here:

<https://www.clemson.edu/centers-institutes/watt/hub/documents/ci-iranian-report-2020.html>

There are surely more of these. I believe you have suspended many in the past.

Let me know if you have thoughts or questions on this.

Darren

[Quoted text hidden]



Iranian Network.xlsx

47K



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Malaysian Disinformation Accounts

17 messages

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Sun, Jan 9, 2022 at 7:15 PM

To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Neema Guliani [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Yoel,

Our lab here at Clemson is working on a project with Shane Harris, national security reporter at the Washington Post. I have something for you and your team related to this work and we are hoping you can help us out.

We've identified a network of accounts active in Malaysian politics across platforms. Based on our ongoing work exploring PRC social media activity, we have some compelling evidence these accounts are run by China. The idea that these accounts might be PRC is consistent with the actors these accounts support. We are hoping you might be able to confirm our attribution.

I'm obviously happy to chat if you want to know more about our attribution. I know Shane will want to talk to someone at Twitter eventually as well, if that is possible after you have had a look at these accounts.

Attached is a file with two tabs.

Tab one (content creators) lists about 50 Facebook accounts (in order of DOB) and (in many cases) Twitter accounts that repost the Facebook content. I would note a few things there are clear suggestions the same actor is running both the Twitter and FB accounts.

Tab two (Retweeters) lists 44 accounts that spend their days mostly retweeting the accounts from the previous tab.

We are particularly interested in @kennan_grover (which you have already suspended) and @TyroneDick4 as these two accounts seem to have been, at various times in their lives, also very clearly active in the PRC's campaign related to Xinjiang.

Unrelated, below I've posted a list of accounts that are part of a very obvious inauthentic network of accounts active on Nepalese politics. You should probably suspend them.

Best,

Darren

Nepalese accounts:

@BhurteSubina
@MoktanKritika
@BhumikadhI
@PriPriya123
@Bpana12
@Suntali_1
@hi_devyanshi
@TweetChor_0
@Hi_iamnisha
@hi_anisha11
@Sami_ok
@Swastima7
@Sagarikaa12
@sugarikak1

@Binitaa22
@Vishakhaa8
@Nepaliheart10
@ghansughanse
@vijaygorkhali_
@star_saurav1
@TheDipesh1
@sugamchhetri14
@Sashwat_kivi

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Darren L. Linvill
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University



Malaysian Trolls for Twitter.xlsx
19K

Yoel Roth [redacted] Sun, Jan 9, 2022 at 11:44 PM
To: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>, William Nuland [redacted]
Cc: Neema Guliani [redacted], Patrick Warren [redacted], Yoel Roth [redacted]

Hey Darren,

Thanks for reaching out. We'd definitely like to dig in on both of these cases to see what it looks like on our end.

I'm adding Will Nuland, our head of Threat Disruption, who will take point on next steps.

Yoel
[Quoted text hidden]

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu> Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 9:58 AM
To: Yoel Roth [redacted]
Cc: William Nuland [redacted], Neema Guliani [redacted], Patrick Warren [redacted]
<[redacted]>

Excellent. Thanks, Yoel.

Will, it's a pleasure. I look forward to speaking to you on this.

DL
[Quoted text hidden]



Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Russian Language Disinformation

3 messages

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>

Mon, Mar 21, 2022 at 1:39 PM

To: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], William Nuland [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Yoel and Will,

I'm writing to ask your assistance.

Last March, we shared with Twitter a list of 244 Russian language accounts working in a manner consistent with the IRA. Our analysis found all 244 of these accounts to have a number of markers suggesting they were operated by a single actor. At that time, you suspended about half of the accounts and suggested the others were authentic nationalist actors. A few months later, however, you suspended the remaining accounts we had supplied (save three which all went permanently inactive on the same day following your suspensions). This background is just to point out that I appreciate how sophisticated this actor given their ability to appear authentic for an extended period of time using the signals you monitor.

As you know from our work with Craig Silverman and Jeff Kao at ProPublica, we identified accounts we attribute to this same actor engaged in disinformation regarding the war in Ukraine. I have to say, it's clear your team is doing an admirable job in mitigating their efforts. You suspended some of these accounts before we were even able to collect data on them!

It's because I know you are drilled in on how this actor operates that I'm reaching out. As discussed in our piece with ProPublica, we identified a number of accounts on both TikTok and Instagram that are clearly run by the same group. TikTok suspended all the accounts we gave them and dozens more. We engaged with Meta about them, however, and Meta claims they see nothing suspicious in their behavior.

The accounts we gave Meta:

1. Share persona (name and profile images, even branded content) of accounts on both Twitter and TikTok that have been suspended in connection to this actor,
2. Share similar, often identical, content as suspended accounts,
3. Post on the same schedule as accounts on TikTok and Twitter that have been suspended,
4. Have high rates of following and follower within the network we have identified,
5. Are still posting Russian language propaganda, despite the current Instagram ban in Russia.

There's just no question in my mind this is the same actor.

Given the ongoing war in Ukraine and the daily atrocities taking place, I'm sure we can all agree shutting down Russian state disinformation on EVERY platform is in our shared best interests. With that in mind I was hoping you might be willing to reach out to your colleagues at Meta and share with them anything you have learned in tracking this actor which might facilitate their work in doing the same.

There are about a dozen accounts we would currently put in this Instagram network (though I'm sure there are many more), but the seven we are most confident of (due to shared persona) are the following:

https://www.instagram.com/facktoria_com/
<https://www.instagram.com/eto.prosto.news/>
https://www.instagram.com/ma_love_russia_/
https://www.instagram.com/vladislavanisimov_/
<https://www.instagram.com/goreopoz1/>
https://www.instagram.com/ruskiy_mishka___/
https://www.instagram.com/mow_mood/

Thanks, both of you. I appreciate how busy you must have been lately.

Darren

--

Darren L. Linvill
Associate Professor
Department of Communication
Clemson University

William Nuland [REDACTED]
To: Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>
Cc: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Wed, Mar 23, 2022 at 5:22 PM

Hi Darren,

Really appreciate the outreach on this, and we're 100% aligned on the importance of getting this stuff right and mitigated across the whole platform ecosystem. Of course we're in close touch with our peers in tech and are generally aware of one another's approaches to abuse mitigation; in this case it's hard to say how and why there is a delta in enforcement of accounts you've raised across platforms. Notably on our side, we have not been able to attribute any of this activity beyond 1/ that it seems connected to what you sent last year (at least in spots), 2/ that it largely appears to be coming out of Russia / Eastern Europe generally and 3/ that there is a pattern of behavior within recently suspended and historically suspended accounts here of engagement on issues that matter to Russia. All this equates to the activity being important for us to manage and a candidate for deeper evaluation in the future, but not an analytical judgment on sponsorship. I suspect our peers find themselves in a similar position.

Having worked on the FB team myself i know that, like us, they are careful with attribution and careful with policy decision making. I can imagine any number of reasons why they would hold off on attribution or enforcement but we don't have any more information than you do on that question right now. We will continue to partner with their team on the sharing of insights as we both manage this crisis, but i'm not sure of how this will influence their thinking if at all. But again, I'm sure they have good reasons for their choices here - they are a diligent and careful group.

Let us know if there's any other aspects you think might be worth looking at here. We're always thankful for your inputs, even (maybe especially) when they force us to think outside the box.

All the best,
WN

[Quoted text hidden]

Darren Linvill <darrenl@g.clemson.edu>
To: William Nuland [REDACTED]
Cc: Yoel Roth [REDACTED], Patrick Warren [REDACTED]

Wed, Mar 23, 2022 at 5:53 PM

Will,

Thanks for this reply. I appreciate the effort your team is obviously putting into this.

Obviously I think attribution is important, it would surely be valuable to tell the Russian people how their government is lying to them. My previous email, however, was not about attribution. I'm speaking only of getting this activity shut down. It's clear to me that both Twitter and TikTok saw some behavior from this actor that suggested these accounts were part of a CIO. It's also clear that Twitter has a very good idea of how this actor operates as you have been tracking their activity over time, even suspending accounts that had previously been able to allude you.

I'm suggesting you might help Meta identify HOW this actor is operating undetected on their platform, not WHO the actor is. We identified only a few accounts but surely there are many more. You know the scale they have operated on your platform.

Honestly, I'm not trying to get anything out of this. Just trying to stop the disinformation.

DL

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